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PREMISES LIABILITY—BREAKING NEWS: IT SNOWS IN MASSA
CHUSETTS AND SNOW IS SLIPPERY. WHY MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD
ADOPT THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE.
INTRODUCTION
In the middle of one of the hottest summers in Massachusetts
in years,1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court came down
with a snowy decision. In July of 2010, the court in Papadopoulos
v. Target Corp. reversed nearly one hundred and thirty years of
precedent and changed the standard of review for cases involving
slip-and-falls on snow and ice.2 The court abolished the “natural
accumulation” rule, a legal rule that had acted as an exception to a
property owner’s duty to use reasonable care under the circum
stances in maintaining his or her property.3 Moving forward, the
court opted to apply the duty of reasonable care generally, without
any exceptions.4 However, in the opinion, the court explicitly noted
that it was not yet deciding whether to adopt a different exception
known as the “storm-in-progress” rule.5 It is the stance of this Note
that, when given the opportunity, the Supreme Judicial Court
should promptly adopt the “storm-in-progress” rule, because it ap
1. See Sizzling Heat Wave Tightens Grip on Northeast, FOX NEWS (July 6, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/weather/2010/07/05/hot-ya-temps-soar-near-east/ (describing
the heat wave that hit the east coast during the summer of 2010).
2. Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 156 (Mass. 2010).
3. Id. at 144.
4. Id. at 154.
We now will apply to hazards arising from snow and ice the same obligation
that a property owner owes to lawful visitors as to all other hazards: a duty to
“act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the likeli
hood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the
burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.”
Id. (citation omitted).
5. Id. at 153-54, n.17. The storm-in-progress rule provides, quite simply, that a
property owner has no duty to remove snow and ice from the property until the storm
has ended and “a reasonable time thereafter.” See Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 244
(Conn. 1989). Currently, Connecticut, Vermont, and Rhode Island apply the storm-in
progress rule, while Maine does not. See Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
767 A.2d 310, 314 (Me. 2001) (refusing to adopt the storm-in-progress rule); Terry v.
Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999); Kraus, 558 A.2d at 243; McCormack v. State, 553 A.2d 566, 568 (Vt. 1988); Turmel v. Univ. of Vt., No. S0980-01
Cncv, 2004 WL 5460386 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004) (stating that “the Storm in Pro
gress Rule, which has been implied in previous Vermont cases, applies”) (citing Wakefield v. Tygate Motel Corp., 640 A.2d 981, 982 (Vt. 1994)).
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propriately balances the interests of the property owner and the
general public, while avoiding most of the complications that led to
the downfall of the natural accumulation rule.
Property owners have good reason to be interested in the legal
standard applied to snow and ice removal because slip-and-falls on
snow and ice are a common occurrence,6 particularly in a northeast
ern state like Massachusetts. Massachusetts is hit heavily by snow
every winter.7 In fact, Boston averages about 42.2 inches of snow
fall per year, and Worcester averages a whopping 67.6 inches per
year.8 And, the reality is—snow is slippery. On top of that, snow
can turn to ice—which is more slippery. In addition, humans, by
design, are prone to slip, trip, and fall. In fact, in a book titled The
Slip and Fall Handbook, the author described the art of human
walking as “an accident waiting to happen.”9 As the author ex
plained it, “[e]ach human step has the potential to be interrupted
with the person teetering on the edge of falling. That accident most
often happens when the normal human locomotor pattern is inter
rupted. A fall is the common end result.”10
Due to these obvious considerations, property owners need
some form of protection from unwarranted slip-and-fall claims, and,
as will be demonstrated, the storm-in-progress rule is the best op
tion at hand to provide this protection. Part I of this Note discusses
the basic tenets of premises liability and gives a synopsis of the
evolution of premises liability, as well as the development and sub
sequent demise of the natural accumulation rule in Massachusetts.
Part II discusses three different approaches to dealing with snow
and ice in premises liability. Part III discusses the reasoning of
Papadopoulos in reaching the conclusion to abolish the natural ac
cumulation rule. Part IV analyzes the different standards and ex
plains why the storm-in-progress rule is the best approach.
6. Slip and Fall Accident Stats, LAWFIRMS.COM, http://www.lawfirms.com/re
sources/personal-injury/slip-and-fall-accident/slip-and-fall-accidents.htm (last visited
May 24, 2012). For example,
over one million Americans suffer a slip, trip, and fall injury and over 17,000
people die in the U.S. annually because of these injuries. Slip, trip and fall
injuries make up 15 percent of all job related injuries, which account for be
tween 12 and 15 percent of all Workers’ Compensation expenses.
Id.
7. National Climatic Data Center, Snowfall–Average Total In Inches, NCDC
(Aug. 20, 2008, 12:21:34 EDT), http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/online/ccd/snowfall.
html.
8. Id.
9. STEPHEN I. ROSEN, THE SLIP AND FALL HANDBOOK 241 (1995).
10. Id.
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THE EVOLUTION OF PREMISES LIABILITY AND THE NATURAL
ACCUMULATION RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS

Premises liability is “the liability of owners or occupiers of real
property for personal injury sustained by entrants (including te
nants) upon the land.”11 In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a
premises liability claim under the tort of negligence, he must show
that: (1) the owner of the premises owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2)
he breached that duty; (3) the owner’s actions or omissions caused
the plaintiff’s loss; and (4) the plaintiff suffered measurable dam
ages.12 This Note focuses on the “duty” and “breach” elements of
premises liability. Specifically, this Note addresses what duty prop
erty owners should owe to visitors on commercial and residential
property.
To be clear, there are legal scenarios that are beyond the scope
of this Note. First, this Note does not discuss premises liability for
municipalities. Public sidewalks, public roads, and other public
property are owned by the municipality and are treated differently
under the law.13 Second, this Note only addresses what the duty
should be, not who should owe the duty. Disagreements regarding
who owes the duty often arise in landlord/tenant law, where the
rights to a property are divided between ownership and possession,14 or where the property owner hires an independent
11. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF PREMISES
LIABILITY § 1.02 (4th ed. 2011)
12. See Glidden v. Maglio, 722 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Mass. 2000); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, 37A
MASS. PRACTICE, TORT LAW § 21.1 (3d ed. 2005).
13. For information on municipal premises liability, see MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 84,
§ 17 (2008).
A county, city or town shall not be liable for an injury or damage sustained
upon a public way by reason of snow or ice thereon, if the place at which the
injury or damage was sustained was at the time of the accident otherwise rea
sonably safe and convenient for travelers.
Id.; Goulart v. Canton Hous. Auth., 783 N.E.2d 864, 866 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003);
NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra note 12, § 21.9.
14. In most cases, property owners both own and occupy the property, and be
cause all legal rights in the property are held by one entity, all premises liability flows to
that person. See WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supra note 11, § 1.04 (4th ed. 2011).
On the other hand, where a property owner decides to become a landlord and lease the
property to a tenant, the rights are split. See Miller v. Berk, 104 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Mass.
1952) (finding a mutual understanding that landlord was to remove snow and ice); Con
nors v. Wick, 59 N.E.2d 277, 278 (Mass. 1945); Backoff v. Weiner, 25 N.E.2d 718, 719
(Mass. 1940) (recognizing that there are “reciprocal obligations” between landlord and
tenant). The landlord has the right to own the property while the tenant has the right to
possess the area that the tenant is leasing. See WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supra
note 11, § 1.05. The potential for liability is determined by who has “control” over the
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contractor to remove the snow.15
The central question to be addressed is simple: what duty
should a commercial or residential property owner have to remove
snow and ice for the safety of visitors that may come onto the prop
erty, and when is that duty breached?
A. Abolishing the Invitee/Licensee Distinction and Adopting the
Duty of Reasonable Care
Prior to 1973, the duty that landowners in Massachusetts owed
to a person on their land varied depending upon whether the visitor
was an “invitee” or a “licensee.”16 Then, in Mounsey v. Ellard, the
Supreme Judicial Court abolished the invitee/licensee distinction
and established the rule that a property owner has a duty of reason
able care for all lawful visitors.17
The court in Mounsey acknowledged that though the “rigid”
division of the invitee/licensee distinction may have made sense at
the time it was created, it found that “[its] application . . . in the
modern context has produced confusion and conflict.”18 The court
area in which the plaintiff fell. See id. § 1.04 (“Where ownership and possession are
divided, the general rule, subject to certain exceptions, is that the possessor or person in
control of the premises is liable for injury suffered by entrants as a result of conditions
or activities that violate a legal duty owed by the possessor to entrants.”).
15. See LOUIS A. LEHR, JR., 2 PREMISES LIABILITY § 41:12 (3d ed. 2010) (“A
landlord has a nondelegable duty to maintain safely those areas over which it has re
tained control, and this duty cannot be avoided by hiring an independent contractor to
make repairs.”); NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra note 12, § 21.3 (discussing landlord and
tenant liabilities to each other).
16. Under traditional common law, the duty owed by a property owner to a visi
tor on a property depended on the visitor’s classification as an invitee, a licensee, or a
trespasser. Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1973). An invitee is someone
that “conferr[ed] a benefit in the performance of something in which the [property
owner] ha[d] an interest.” Id. at 50 (quoting Taylor v. Goldstein, 107 N.E.2d 14, 16
(Mass. 1952)). A common example of an invitee is a customer on commercial property.
See, e.g., Mansfield v. Spear, 48 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1943) (plaintiff who was enter
ing a business was an invitee). A licensee, on the other hand, is someone on the prop
erty “for his [or her] own convenience or pleasure.” Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 45
(quoting Sweeny V. OLD COLONY & NEWPORT R.R. CO., 83 Mass. 368, 373 (Mass.
1865)). A trespasser is someone who is illegally on the property without permission.
Monterosso v. Gaudette, 391 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). To an invitee, a
property owner owed a duty to “‘exercise ordinary care and prudence to render his
premises reasonably safe.’” Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 57 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh’s
Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir 1972)). To both licensees and trespassers, prop
erty owners owed a much lesser duty merely “not to inflict wilful or wanton injury.” Id.
at 45.
17. See Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 51-52.
18. Id. at 49 (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 630-31 (1959)) (internal quotation omitted).
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pointed out that the lines between licensee and invitee were ob
scure and often blurred,19 which provided the court with sufficient
justification to adopt the duty of reasonable care as the requisite
standard for property owners to all “lawful visitors.”20 The duty
towards trespassers remained unchanged, as they are not lawful
visitors.21
Pursuant to Mounsey the prevailing rule in Massachusetts has
been that landowners generally owe a duty to all lawful visitors to
use “reasonable care in all the circumstances.”22 The duty of rea
sonable care specifically requires a landowner to “act as a reasona
ble man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition
in view of all the circumstances.”23 This duty applies to protect all
lawful visitors, including tenants.24 In making a determination, the
jury is to rely upon three factors: “[1] the likelihood of injury to
others, [2] the seriousness of the injury, and [3] the burden of avoid
ing the risk.”25
B. A Subset of the Duty of Reasonable Care: The Duty to
Remove Defects from the Property
Included in this catch-all duty to use reasonable care in main
taining the property is the duty to remove defects from the prop
erty.26 One of the most common examples of a defect is a foreign
substance that is dropped or left in a place where people might in
19. In particular, the court noted that it was difficult to determine when a public
employee or official on private property qualifies as an invitee, a licensee, or a tres
passer, as they do not fit neatly into any category. Id. at 46-49.
20. Id. at 51.
21. The court in Mounsey specifically noted that trespassers are not considered
“lawful visitors.” Id. at 51 n.7.
22. Id. at 52; see also Ali v. City of Boston, 804 N.E.2d 927, 931 (Mass. 2004)
(holding that “[l]andowners now owe a reasonable duty of care to all lawful visitors”);
Davis v. Westwood Group, 652 N.E.2d 567, 569-70 (Mass. 1995) (applying the reasona
bleness standard from Mounsey).
23. Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 52 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh’s Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d
97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
24. King v. G & M Realty Corp., 370 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Mass. 1977). Relying on
Mounsey’s “rule that [all] occupiers owe a duty of reasonable care to all lawful visitors,”
the court concluded that this duty should extend to landlords because they are also
“occupiers.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25. Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 52 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh’s Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d
97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
26. Aylward v. McCloskey, 587 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1992) (“[U]nder Massa
chusetts law, landowners are liable only for injuries caused by defects existing on their
property . . . .”), overruled by Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142 (Mass.
2010).
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jure themselves upon it.27 A property owner may be found negli
gent for injuries that result from dangerous foreign substances
where he or she either (1) created the dangerous condition or (2)
had actual or constructive knowledge of its presence and failed
within a reasonable time to remove it.28
One example of the property owner “creating” the dangerous
foreign substance is where the design of the physical property itself
causes the dangerous condition to develop.29 The most common
example of a dangerous foreign substance created by the physical
property itself is dangerous accumulations of water on flooring.30
Liability may result where flooring is inappropriately slanted or de
signed in a manner that causes water to collect in a puddle, or
where the type of flooring or gloss on the flooring becomes particu
larly slippery when wet.31
The property owner also “creates” the dangerous condition if
employees of the business drop or leave items in an area that is
trafficked by pedestrians. For example, in Jennings v. First National
27. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 292 N.E.2d 863, 864
(Mass. 1973) (hard, dirty substance on stairway); Deagle v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
178 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Mass. 1961) (pine oil on floor); Uchman v. Polish Nat’l Home,
Inc., 116 N.E.2d 145, 145 (Mass. 1953) (banana peel); Jennings v. First Nat. Stores, Inc.,
3 N.E.2d 179, 179–80 (Mass. 1936) (employees dropped grapes on floor); Judson v. Am.
Ry. Express Co., 136 N.E. 103, 103 (Mass. 1922) (water on floor from mopping); Wexler
v. Stanetsky Memorial Chapel of Brookline, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 686, 686-88 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1975) (melted snow carried onto premises by patrons).
28. See, e.g., Jennings, 3 N.E.2d at 179-80 (employees created condition); Wexler,
321 N.E.2d at 686-88 (condition created by physical structure of property); see also
NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra note 12, § 21.8 (“Proof of the defendant’s negligence may
consist of showing that he caused the offending substance to be at the place of injury or,
if someone else caused it to be there, that the defendant knew or should have known of
its presence and failed within a reasonable time to remove it.”) (citations omitted).
29. See infra notes 30-31. For examples of outdoor property attributes that redi
rect snow or ice and may result in liability for the property owner, see infra notes 79-87.
30. See, e.g., Correira v. Atl. Amusement Co., 18 N.E.2d 435, 436 (Mass. 1939).
For examples of cases where water was left on the floor and liability was considered, but
ultimately rejected, see Wexler v. Stanetsky Mem’l Chapel of Brookline, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); Lowe v. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Boston, 292
N.E.2d 683, 685-86 (Mass. 1973).
31. See Correira v. Atl. Amusement Co., 18 N.E.2d 435, 436 (Mass. 1939) (finding
the property owner liable where puddle was “about two and one half feet wide by four
feet long, and of such a depth that a movement of the foot would cause a ‘splash’”); see
also Wexler v. Stanetsky Mem’l Chapel of Brookline, Inc., 321 N,E,2d 686, 687-88
(Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (citations omitted) (finding the property owner not liable, in
part, because there was “no evidence that the floor, for any reason, became peculiarly
slippery when wet”); Lowe v. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Boston, 292 N.E.2d 683, 685-86
(Mass. 1973) (similarly finding no liability where “[t]he plaintiff has not proven that a
tile floor is inherently defective when wet”).
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Stores, Inc., the court found a grocery store liable when employees
dropped cartons of grapes they were carrying into the grocery store,
failed to pick them up, and a customer later slipped on them.32
Also, in Rossley v. S. S. Kresge Co., the business owner was held
liable when the plaintiff slipped on an “accumulation of sweepings,”
which were swept up by employees and then left in a trafficked
area.33
Aside from creating the condition, a property owner may also
be found liable if he had notice (actual or constructive) that a dan
gerous condition existed and failed to fix it within a reasonable
time.34 The property owner has actual notice of a danger if he, or
his employees, actually see the danger.35 Constructive notice, on
the other hand, is present if the owner merely should have seen the
danger.36 It is often difficult to prove actual knowledge considering
the defendant will deny having seen it; thus constructive knowledge
is the route most often used.37
In determining constructive knowledge, the two relevant fac
tors considered are: (1) the location of the substance; and (2) the
32. Jennings, 3 N.E.2d at 180 (“The jury could find that in dropping so many
grapes, and in not discovering and removing them, those employees were negligent.”);
see also Bennett v. Cohen, 39 N.E.2d 571, 571 (Mass. 1942) (property owner found
liable when fruits and vegetables on a sidewalk stand were stacked in a way that it was
“likely to result in some of their contents falling on the sidewalk”). But see Kanter v.
Mass. Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc., 164 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Mass. 1960) (“There was no
finding from which it could be concluded that the suet was on the ramp by reason of
any act of any person for whose conduct the defendant was responsible.”); Beach v. S.
S. Kresge Co., 20 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Mass. 1939) (insufficient evidence that defendant’s
employees dropped the ice cream which plaintiff slipped on).
33. See Rossley v. S. S. Kresge Co., 162 N.E.2d 26, 27 (Mass. 1959).
34. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 292 N.E.2d 863, 864-65 (Mass.
1973); Hennessey v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 836 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005); see also NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra note 12, § 21.8 (“[I]f someone else
caused [the offending substance] to be there, . . . [and] the [property owner] knew or
should have known of its presence and failed within a reasonable time to remove it,”
the property owner can be liable for negligence.) (citation omitted).
35. Oliveri, 292 N.E.2d at 864-65 (Mass. 1973) (negligence of property owner re
sulted from employees’ actual knowledge of danger).
36. Id. “In the more usual case, however, the plaintiff attempts to establish the
defendant’s negligence by showing that the foreign substance was present on the defen
dant’s premises for such a length of time that the defendant should have known about
it.” Id. at 865.
37. David Peeples, Lawsuit Shaping and Legal Sufficiency: The Accelerator and
the Brakes of Civil Litigation, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 387 (2010) (“The plaintiff usu
ally has no direct evidence that an employee actually knew of a slippery substance, or
that the substance had been on the floor long enough to put any employees on con
structive notice that it was there.”).
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time within which the defendant should have observed it.38 For in
stance, in Gallagher v. Stop & Shop, Inc., summary judgment for
the property owner was denied where an ice cream cone was
dropped in a trafficked and visible area and there was sufficient
time for the employees to remove it.39 The ice cream cone was left
on the floor right next to the exit door, where many customers
passed through and where it was in plain sight to three cashiers for
a period of at least thirty minutes.40
It is often difficult to determine how long something has been
on the floor, so the jury looks to “its character, its consistency, . . .
and general appearance” as a guide.41 For this reason, the courts
and juries look to see whether an item was dirty or walked on.42 In
cases involving organic matters, the courts also look to whether the
thing is rotten or decayed.43 However, the appearance of the sub
stance is not conclusive: the plaintiff often loses these slip-and-fall
cases44 even though it is claimed that the thing looked dirty or old.45
38. See White v. Mugar, 181 N.E. 725, 725-26 (Mass. 1932). There is also a unique
approach taken for “self-service” stores, such as grocery stores. Sheehan v. Roche
Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1286 (Mass. 2007). For self-service stores,
the notice requirement is met “if a plaintiff proves that an unsafe condition on an
owner’s premises exists that was reasonably foreseeable, resulting from an owner’s selfservice business or mode of operation, and the plaintiff slips as a result of the unsafe
condition.” Id.
39. Gallagher v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 126 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Mass. 1955). But see
Kelleher v. Dini’s, Inc., 118 N.E.2d 77, 78 (Mass. 1954) (no constructive notice of carrot
left on floor where “[i]t did not appear that . . . employees of the defendant had reason
to be in that portion of the premises where the plaintiff fell”).
40. Gallagher, 126 N.E.2d at 192.
41. Foley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 199 N.E. 739, 740 (Mass. 1936).
42. See, e.g., Hastings v. Boston & Maine R.R., 123 N.E.2d 211, 211 (Mass. 1954)
(holding that the defendants could have been found liable to plaintiff because the
“greasy substance” on the stairs at railroad station was covered with dirt, showing that
the grease had been there for a long time); Berube v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp.,
51 N.E.2d 777, 779 (Mass. 1943) (holding the jury’s finding was not erroneous when it
found the plaintiff slipped on squash that was on for floor for a long period of time
because of its “sticky mass, its grimy, dirty color, its size and general appearance”);
Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 386, 386 (Mass. 1911) (judgment for plaintiff
where banana peel “felt dry, gritty, as if there were dirt upon it, as if trampled over a
good deal, [and] as flattened down”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See, e.g., Connair v. J. H. Beattie Co., 11 N.E.2d 499, 499 (Mass. 1937) (noting
“dirty brown” wax beans and “black” strawberries that were rotten).
44. Webber v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 1464, 2003 WL 139780, at *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2003) (“[C]ases which found there were sufficient circumstances to affix liabil
ity are not as numerous . . . [as] cases denying liability.”).
45. See, e.g, FINE V. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO., 178 N.E.2d 501, 501 (Mass. 1961)
(summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff testified that the plastic bag she
tripped on was “‘dirty, semiopaque and ground’ and you could not see through it”);
Mandigo v. Hamid Amusement Co., 57 N.E.2d 553, 553 (Mass. 1944) (summary judg
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C. Premises Liability for Snow and Ice: The Rise and Fall of the
Natural Accumulation Rule
Contrary to all other foreign substances, snow and ice in Mas
sachusetts were not traditionally considered defects that the prop
erty owner had a duty to remove.46 This exception, known as the
“natural accumulation” rule, was developed over a century ago and
persisted until Papadopoulos v. Target Corp. in 2010.47
1. Landlord-Tenant Law
The “natural accumulation” rule was introduced almost one
hundred and thirty years ago, in Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton
Co., in connection with landlord-tenant law.48 There, the tenant
slipped and fell on granite steps, which formed the entrance into
her house.49 Snow and ice had accumulated on the steps, which the
landlord never removed.50 In declaring that it was the tenant’s duty
to clear the steps, the court stated, “there was no duty on the part of
the [landlord] to the [tenant] to remove from the steps the ice and
snow which naturally accumulated thereon.”51
Two years later, in Watkins v. Goodall, the Supreme Judicial
Court made a distinction between a “natural” accumulation and an
“artificial” accumulation.52 The court distinguished Watkins from
Woods because the fall occurred on ice that had developed due to
water spilling from a broken water pipe.53 The pipes were “ar
ranged . . . so that they would divert the water from its natural
course and carry it away from the platform,” and the pipe was bro
ken such that “the water was discharged artificially in one place
ment for defendant where mass of candy and paper was “dark”, “dirty”, and had
“marks ‘like print of foot’”).
46. See Aylward v. McCloskey, 587 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1992), overruled by
Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 2010).
47. See generally Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 156 (abolishing the natural ac
cumulation rule).
48. Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 357 (Mass. 1883); see
also Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 146 (“Many commentators and out-of-state courts
declare . . . that the Massachusetts rule that property owners owe no duty to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice originated with this court’s 1883 decision in
Woods.”).
49. Woods, 134 Mass. at 358-59.
50. Id. at 358 (“[The landlord] never undertook to remove any snow or ice . . .
from any part of the premises . . . .”).
51. Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
52. Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533 (Mass. 1883). See also Papadopoulos, 930
N.E.2d at 147.
53. Watkins, 138 Mass. at 534.
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upon the platform.”54 The court described this as “an artificial for
mation of ice, resulting directly from the negligent omission of the
[property owner] . . . .”55
This early distinction between “natural” and “artificial” accu
mulations would become the cornerstone upon which the natural
accumulation rule was based and the central concern in most
cases.56
2. Extending and refining the natural accumulation rule
For most of the twentieth century, it was unclear whether the
natural accumulation rule applied only to landlord-tenant situations
or whether it also extended to general premises liability.57 How
ever, the confusion was settled in the early 1990s when the First
Circuit and subsequently the Supreme Judicial Court, concluded
that in Massachusetts the natural accumulation rule applied not
only to tenants, but also to all lawful visitors.58
In 1990, Athas v. United States, a First Circuit case, found no
duty to remove ice from a covered outdoor entrance to a commer
cial establishment.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
upon two Massachusetts cases where business visitors fell on slip
pery flooring.60 The court affirmed the notion that a slippery floor,
and correspondingly a slippery outdoor entrance, alone does not
result in negligence for the landowner; rather, there must also be
“evidence that the injury was caused by a defect, or wear, or other

54. Id. at 537.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. This fact is evidenced by Athas and Aylward, finding that the natural accumu
lation rule applied, while Papadopoulos held that the Aylward holding was unfounded.
See Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 1990); Aylward v. McCloskey, 587
N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1992). But see Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 149 (Mass. 2010)
(finding that the Aylward holding was unfounded and stating that when Aylward
adopted the natural accumulation rule, “a relic of abandoned landlord-tenant law was
resurrected as an exception to the governing standard of reasonable care”).
58. See Athas, 904 F.2d at 82-83; Aylward, 587 N.E.2d at 230.
59. Athas, 904 F.2d at 81.
60. Id. (citing Lowe v. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Boston, 292 N.E.2d 683, 685
(Mass. 1973)).
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condition not natural to the flooring.”61 Because the ice had natu
rally accumulated on the porch, there was no duty to remove it.62
Two years later, in Aylward v. McCloskey, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court adopted and reinforced Athas in state law,
making clear that the natural accumulation rule applied to all slip
and-falls on residential and commercial property.63 In granting
summary judgment against a plaintiff who slipped on a residential
driveway, the court plainly stated the general rule: “[L]andowners
are liable only for injuries caused by defects existing on their prop
erty and . . . the law does not regard the natural accumulation of
snow and ice as an actionable property defect . . . .”64 The natural
accumulation rule, broadly applied to all “landowners,” was indis
putably an exception to the general duty of reasonable care by
1992.65
D. Abolishing the Natural Accumulation Rule: Papadopoulos v.
Target Corp.
In July 2010, in Papadopoulos, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju
dicial Court unanimously decided to abolish the natural accumula
tion rule and instead require the same duty of reasonable care to
snow and ice removal as is applied to all other foreign substances.66
The court declared, the factors to consider in determining the rea
sonableness of snow removal are: “[1] the amount of foot traffic to
be anticipated on the property, [2] the magnitude of the risk reason
ably feared, and [3] the burden and expense of snow and ice re
moval.”67 A question for the jury, this determination must be made
61. Id. (quoting Lowe, 292 N.E.2d at 685) (emphasis added); see also Policronis v.
Jordan Marsh Co., 129 N.E.2d 913, 913 (Mass. 1955) (customer slipped on muddy step);
Di Noto v. Gilchrist Co., 125 N.E.2d 239, 239-40 (Mass. 1955) (customer tripped on step
that was worn down); Grace v. Jordan Marsh Co., 59 N.E.2d 283, 283-84 (Mass. 1945)
(customer slipped on muddy step). Contra Risk v. City of Boston, 59 N.E.2d 184, 185
(Mass. 1945) (rounded curbing did not constitute “defect”).
62. Athas, 904 F.2d at 82.
Since the traditional rule in Massachusetts is that a landowner’s liability for
injuries incurred on his premises depends, inter alia, on the existence of a de
fect or hazard other than a natural accumulation of water, or ice, or snow, that
is the rule we must apply until the Massachusetts courts decide differently.
Id.
63. Aylward, 587 N.E.2d at 230 (affirming the trial court, which relied on Athas).
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 149 (Mass. 2010).
66. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154.
67. Id. These factors are the same as those applied for the general reasonable
ness standard, however merely particularized to snow removal. See Mounsey v. Ellard,
297 N.E.2d 43, 52 (Mass. 1973) (citation omitted).
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on a case-by-case basis.68 With this decision, the court discarded
nearly a hundred thirty years of reliance on the natural accumula
tion rule.69
II.

THREE APPROACHES

TO

SNOW

AND

ICE

Papadopoulos opted to apply the duty of reasonable care;70
however, to understand the implications and practical effects of this
decision, we must look carefully at the different options available.
There are essentially three legal approaches to snow and ice re
moval. One approach, exemplified by Papadopoulos, is to apply
the duty of reasonable care generally to every situation, without
any exceptions.71 The second approach is to apply the “natural ac
cumulation” rule as an exception to the general duty of reasonable
care.72 The third approach, which will subsequently be explained, is
to apply a different exception, known as the “storm-in-progress”
rule, to the duty of reasonable care.73 This Part will take a close
look at the purpose and application of these three options.
A. The Natural Accumulation Rule
The natural accumulation rule is based upon the general pre
mise that snow, ice, sleet, and freezing rain are not defects, and,
therefore, the property owner has no duty to remove them.74 How
68. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154 (“[A] fact finder will determine what snow
and ice removal efforts are reasonable in light of the expense they impose on the land
owner and the probability and seriousness of the foreseeable harm to others.”) (citation
omitted).
69. See id. at 154 (abolishing the natural accumulation rule in Massachusetts);
Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 361 (Mass. 1883) (first establish
ing the natural accumulation rule in Massachusetts).
70. See Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1990); Aylward v.
McCloskey, 587 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1992).
73. New England states that have applied the storm-in-progress rule are Connect
icut, Vermont, and Rhode Island. See Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243-44 (Conn.
1989); Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999); Turmel v.
Univ. of Vermont, No. S0980-01 Cncv, 2004 WL 5460386 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004)
(citing Wakefield v. Tygate Motel Corp., 640 A.2d 981, 982 (Vt. 1994)).
74. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Swann v. Flatley, 749 F.
Supp. 338, 341, 342 (D. Mass. 1990) (freezing rain is a natural accumulation), aff’d, 953
F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1991); Palmer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, No. 09-P-1196,
2010 WL 1752599, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. May 4, 2010) review denied 939 N.E.2d 786
(Mass. 2010), rev’d 2011 WL 488686 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); Goulart v. Canton Hous.
Auth., 783 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). Contra Zanfanga v. SBK Assocs.
LLC, No. ESCV-2005-146, 2007 WL 1300962, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2007)
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ever, in some situations, these natural accumulations may become
an “artificial accumulation,” which is considered a defect that the
property owner has a duty to remove.75 Thus, the crux of the natu
ral accumulation rule lies in the determination of when or how an
“artificial accumulation” is formed.
The guidelines for distinguishing between “natural” and “artifi
cial” accumulations were established in Aylward.76 According to
the court, an artificial accumulation is formed if “some act or failure
to act has changed the condition of naturally accumulated snow and
ice, and the elements alone or in connection with the land become a
hazard to lawful visitors.”77 Differently put, a duty to remove the
snow or ice is found only upon a showing of evidence that, as a
result of the landowners “act or failure to act,” the natural accumu
lation has been sufficiently altered to the point that it can be la
beled as “artificial.”78 As these guidelines have been applied, the
case law has addressed the most common scenarios related to the
accumulation and removal of snow and ice, and has clarified when
an “artificial” accumulation is formed.
1. Accumulation Redirected from its Natural Course onto a
Public Way Due to the Physical Structure of Property
Similar to other foreign substances,79 a property owner may
“create” an artificial accumulation of snow or ice if the physical
property itself is designed or altered in a way that redirects snow or
water such that it accumulates dangerously in an area trafficked by
pedestrians.80 A property owner is not negligent for merely
“chang[ing] the surface of his lot, or improv[ing] it by the construc
tion of buildings or by other means” in a manner which alters the
“natural course of [the] surface water.”81 However, a property
owner may be negligent for “collect[ing] water into a definite chan
nel by a spout or otherwise and pour[ing] it upon a public way . . .
[if] through the operation of natural causes the water freezes
(freezing rain can become an unnatural accumulation if it is combined with snow that
was shoveled into a pile).
75. See Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533, 537 (Mass. 1885).
76. See Aylward, 587 N.E.2d at 230.
77. Id. at 230 n.3 (citations omitted).
78. See id.
79. See supra notes 29-31.
80. See Field v. Gowdy, 85 N.E. 884, 885 (Mass. 1908).
81. Baker v. Cummings, No. 98297, 2000 WL 33170696, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 15, 2000) (quoting Field, 85 N.E. at 885).
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. . . .”82 For example, a property owner may be liable for angling a
roof gutter such that it redirects water onto a public walkway83 or
designing a parking lot with increased pitch for water drainage pur
poses such that it redirects more water towards the center of the
parking lot.84 Liability may also ensue from a broken water pipe,
where the water leaks onto a walkway and then freezes.85
To prove liability, it must be shown that the plaintiff slipped on
ice that was clearly formed by the snow or water that was channeled
in a particular direction by the property owner. For example, no
liability was found where a roadway in an apartment complex was
“constructed for water to run from the center of the road to the
sides to the curbing and eventually into the catch basin,” which was
located near the plaintiff’s vehicle in the parking lot.86 In granting
summary judgment for the property owner, the court stated that the
run-off water was not “channeled” as it is by a roof gutter, nor was
there sufficient evidence that the ice the plaintiff slipped on was
formed from the run-off water from the road.87
2. Snow that Has Been Shoveled, Plowed, or Salted
Generally, shoveling or plowing snow will not result in liability
for the property owner; however, there are exceptions. Snow that
has been shoveled or plowed from an area and placed into a pile
82. Id. (quoting Field, 85 N.E. at 885) (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Field, 85 N.E. at 885 (gutters on roof redirected water onto a public
way).
84. For instance, where a parking lot that was designed with a “one-half inch per
foot, or twice the degree of recommended pitch,” which gave the lot a “bowl shape” so
everything slanted towards the middle for drainage purposes, the ice that accumulated
in the middle was an artificial accumulation. Reardon v. Parisi, 822 N.E.2d 748, 751-53
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005). Also, as a rule, the more sloped a lot is, the more vigilant the
owner is expected to be. See id. at 753 (expert stating that “[t]he degree of danger and
hazard of the iced-over slope increases with the degree of pitch”); see also Sullivan v.
Ross, No. 9762, 2002 WL 500342, at *1 (Mass. App. Div. Mar. 27, 2002) (judgment
notwithstanding verdict denied where defendant’s failure to repair the roof and gutters
allowed the water to accumulate on the porch unnaturally). Contra Dipersio v. TX
Planning Trust, No. 08-P-2004, 2009 WL 3350136, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 20, 2009)
(no liability for parking lot at zero grade); Dionisio v. Levin, No., 08-P-777, 2009 WL
1011060, at *2 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 16, 2009) (distinguishing from Reardon, sum
mary judgment granted for property owner even though the parking lot was slanted,
because no “evidence that the defendant had deliberately pitched the parking lot for
drainage purposes”).
85. See, e.g., Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533, 537 (1885).
86. Baker v. Cummings, No. 98297, 2000 WL 33170696, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 15, 2000).
87. Id. at *2-3.
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remains a natural accumulation.88 And, any snow that falls off of
the pile or melts off of the pile and refreezes is also a natural ac
cumulation.89 Also, putting salt or sand down, which then melts the
snow or ice, does not change the accumulation from natural to arti
ficial.90 Indeed, even snow that is piled directly “uphill of a walk
way onto which it then melts and refreezes” remains a natural
accumulation.91 Along these lines, it has been acknowledged that
liability does not ensue even though the “human act or failure to act
. . . foreseeably increase[s] the risk of mishap.”92
Furthermore, “incomplete shoveling”93 does not lead to an ar
tificial formation.94 For instance, in Sullivan v. Brookline, the prop
erty owner shoveled an entrance ramp to the building and by doing
so, exposed an icy layer underneath.95 The court rejected the plain
tiff’s argument that the defendant should be liable because of “bad
88. See, e.g., Lopes v. SSB Realty, Inc., No. 04-P-272, 2005 WL 2400894, at *2
(Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 29, 2005) (“Plowing a roadway and leaving a ridge formed by the
plowing does not transform the plowed snow into an unnatural accumulation.”).
89. See Palmer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, No. 09-P-1196, 2010 WL
1752599, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. May 4, 2010); Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d
142, 144 (Mass. 2010). For other instances of snow melting off of a snow pile, upon
which the plaintiff slipped, that resulted in no liability, see Cooper v. Braver, Healey &
Co., 67 N.E.2d 657, 657 (Mass. 1946); Leary v. Mall at Liberty Tree LLC, No. 07-323-B,
2008 WL 4415118, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2008); Godden v. Stoughton Plaza,
LLC, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 98, 99 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 19, 2007); Taylor v. Mass. Flora
Realty, Inc., 840 A.2d 1126, 1130 (R.I. 2004).
90. See Goulart v. Canton Housing Auth., 783 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003) (“[T]he application of salt to an icy surface [was not] the introduction of a new
hazard.”); see also Dionisio v. Levin, No. 08-P-777, 2009 WL 1011060, at *2 n.2 (Mass.
App. Ct. Apr. 16, 2009) (“The fact that the area had not been salted or sanded is alone
not enough, particularly where, as here, the storm had only just ended at the time of the
plaintiff’s fall.”).
91. Dipersio v. TX Planning Trust, No. 08-P-2004, 2009 WL 3350136, at *1 (Mass.
App. Ct. Oct. 20, 2009) (citing Cooper v. Braver, Healey & Co., 67 N.E. 2d 657, 657
(Mass. 1946)); see also Sternbane v. Worcester Jewish Cmty. Hous. for the Elderly, Inc.,
No. 082427D, 2010 WL 653965, at *2 (Mass. Super. Jan. 28, 2010) (no liability when
parking lot plowed and no evidence of tire tracks, footprints, or packed snow). Contra
Reardon v. Parisi, 822 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (finding liability for
sloped parking lot).
92. Goulart, 783 N.E.2d at 867.
93. Id.
94. See Dipersio, 2009 WL 3350136, at *2 (“[I]ncomplete shoveling” “is not
grounds for a finding of negligence in Massachusetts.”); see also Ippolito v. Bradford
Vill. Condo. Trust, No. 08-00042, 2009 WL 3490953, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 27,
2009) (snow had been shoveled the night before, leaving the ice underneath, and then
new thin layer of snow fell on top); Sanderson v. Fineberg Cos., No. 0304980, 2005 WL
1683774, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 20, 2005) (snow shoveling that revealed icy sur
face did not create the condition).
95. Sullivan v. Town of Brookline, 626 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Mass. 1994).
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shoveling.”96 The court declared that the property owner could not
be liable because he did not “create” the ice on the ramp, but rather
merely “exposed ice that was already there.”97 This rule extends
from the general premise that snow that is left undisturbed is natu
ral; the layer underneath was left undisturbed and thus remained
natural.
However, snow moved into a pile may become an artificial ac
cumulation if the composition of the snow is altered during the pro
cess of moving it or the snow is piled in a trafficked area.98 For
instance, snow that was “compacted by a plow,” creating a hard, icy
block in the middle of a pile otherwise made of normal snow, was
an artificial accumulation.99 Additionally, a snow pile may be artifi
cial if it is moved into a dangerous place, such as onto the walkway,
as opposed to off of it.100
3. Snow that Has Been Altered by Human Traffic
Snow that is altered by human traffic of some kind, either
walking or driving, can become an artificial accumulation;101 how
ever, the size of the marks in the snow and the amount of time that
they need to remain there is less clear. Seidlitz v. Beverly Enter
prises illustrates this point.102 In Seidlitz, the court found that
holes in ice created by human traffic, which were the size of “divots
on a golf course,” were too small to change the accumulation from
96. Id. at 872 n.1.
97. Id. at 872.
98. See infra notes 99-100.
99. Barrasso v. Hillview West Condo. Trust, 904 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009) (issue of material fact found where plaintiff stepped on “hardened compacted
snow and ice”); see also Arnold v. Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard & Nantucket S.S.
Auth., No. 04-00279, 2006 WL 4119676, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2006) (finding
an issue of material fact when “ridges 8 to 10 inches high on both sides of the travel lane
[were] caused by the plows going through” and “plaintiff described the snow as ‘crusty
and hard and icy’”).
100. Plante v. Town of Blackstone, No. 092632, 2010 WL 2764696, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Ct. May 11, 2010) (“Snow plows removing snow from the road and pushing it
onto the sidewalks, or other human activity, may have contributed to the formation of
the snow banks. Such circumstances may render the snow banks an unnatural accumu
lation of snow.”) (citing Phipps v. Aptucxet Post # 5988 V.F.W. Bldg. Ass’n, 389 N.E.2d
1042, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)).
101. See, e.g., Delano v. Garrettson-Ellis Lumber Co., 281 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Mass.
1972) (“‘muddy ice,’ with tire marks and ruts”); Phipps, 389 N.E.2d at 1042 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1979) (footprints and tire tracks); Brooks v. Manzaro, No. 062501A, 2008 WL
5146863, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2008).
102. Seidlitz v. Beverly Enters., Inc., No. 08 P 1123, 2009 WL 902113, at *1 (Mass.
App. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009).
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natural to artificial.103 Artificial accumulations, the court argued,
have only been found where larger hazards were created, such as
“an ice crusted rut of approximately three inches in depth, and six
to eight inches in width . . . [which had lasted for] over two days,”
and “ice ruts [that] were three to four inches in depth, [with] holes
[that] were obscured by a one-half inch overlay of snow.”104 This
distinction between small, golf-course-sized divots and larger holes
that are several inches in depth or width is inherently difficult.
4. Passage of Time
A natural accumulation may turn into an artificial accumula
tion simply “by virtue of the passage of time.”105 This rationale is
based upon the notion “that when a dangerous condition has ex
isted for a sufficient time, the landowner has been afforded the op
portunity to become aware of it and, in the exercise of reasonable
care, to correct it.”106 Although the case law is rather scarce on this
topic, Dionisio v. Levin provides the best available guidance.107 In
Dionisio, the court granted summary judgment for the property
owner when it snowed about ten inches the day before and the
parking lot was plowed that same night.108 The court noted that,
“the ruts were new; this is not a case where deep, frozen ruts were
allowed to remain for several days.”109
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. (citing Phipps, 389 N.E.2d at 1042; Delano, 281 N.E.2d at 283-84). For an
example of a court finding no liability where there were no holes or ruts that could be
an artificial accumulation, see Philips v. Earle W. Kazis Assocs., Inc., No.
MICV200603466C, 2008 WL 2895904, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2008), aff’d, No.
08 P 1452, 2009 WL 1851149, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. June 30, 2009) (allowing summary
judgment where ice was flat with no ruts). For examples of holes or ruts that were
sufficient enough to be considered an “artificial” accumulation, see Dalbec v. Am.
Polymers, Inc., No. 0400514A, 2005 WL 2373853, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2005)
(denying summary judgment because jury could find that the “vehicles, routinely create
tracks though [sic] the five- to six-foot expanse of snow” and “that such constant foot
and vehicular tracks froze into ruts of slippery ice,” which could have “created an un
natural accumulation of hard, compacted snow and ice.”); Wahle v. Arturo’s Rest., Inc.,
No. 010056, 2003 WL 1963223, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2003) (observing that ice
was “rutted” and “thick”).
105. Dionisio v. Levin, No. 08-P-777, 2009 WL 1011060, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct.
Apr. 16, 2009) (emphasis added); see also Rayburn v. Minuteman Grp., Inc., No. 04 P
1640, 2005 WL 3005712, at *1 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 9, 2005) (two hours insufficient
to create artificial accumulation).
106. Dionisio, 2009 WL 1011060, at *2.
107. See id.
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *2; see also Walsh v. Akbarian, No. MICV200504104C, 2007 WL
3317771, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2007) (granting summary judgment when snow
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To clarify, time alone is insufficient to create an artificial ac
cumulation and hence impose a duty to remove the snow or ice; for
a duty to exist, the passage in time must have caused a change in
the composition of the snow or ice.110 It is still true that snow and
ice are not a defect, unless they become an artificial accumula
tion.111 Thus, snow that sits for a few days, but remains in the same
state, cannot be the basis for liability.112 Probably due to practical
and logical difficulties, there are no cases finding that weather con
ditions, natural occurrences, have created an “artificial” accumula
tion due to the passage of time.113
B. Storm-in-Progress Rule
The storm-in-progress rule is a bright-line rule that a property
owner is not expected to remove snow or ice during a snow
storm.114 The rule was introduced to New England by the Connect
icut Supreme Court in 1989.115 Prior to this, Connecticut applied
the duty of reasonable care for several decades without any excep
tions.116 However, Connecticut eventually decided to give property
owners more protection from liability by adopting the storm-in-pro
gress rule as an exception to the duty of reasonable care.117 The
rule was laid down in Kraus v. Newton:
[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in
fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise
reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of
snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time
cleared two-and-a-half hours earlier and there were no complaints that the snow was
slippery in that time span).
110. Otherwise, the notion of an exception for “passage of time” negates the nat
ural accumulation rule. Under the natural accumulation rule, the property owner never
has a duty to remove natural accumulations, so long as they remain “natural.” See
Aylward v. McCloskey, 587 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1992). The case law shows that a
transition to an “artificial” accumulation requires a change in the composition or shape
of the snow. See supra Part II.A.
111. See Aylward, 587 N.E.2d at 230.
112. See id.
113. This conclusion is based upon the fact that no subsequent cases have cited to
Dionisio v. Levin, No. 08-P-777, 2009 WL 1011060 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 16, 2009).
114. See Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243-44 (Conn. 1989). Like the natural
accumulation rule, it acts as an exception to the general duty of reasonable care for
snow removal. See infra notes 116-120.
115. Id.
116. Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 A. 705, 706-07 (Conn. 1925).
117. See Kraus, 558 A.2d at 243-44.
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thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and
steps.118

In essence, absent “unusual circumstances,” the duty to use reason
able care to remove snow and ice is suspended during the storm, as
well as “a reasonable time thereafter.”119 After this time has en
ded, the duty to use reasonable care to remove snow and ice re
turns.120 Put differently, a property owner has the duty to use
reasonable care to remove snow and ice at all times, except while
the storm is ongoing and a reasonable time thereafter.
The storm-in-progress rule, though most entrenched in Con
necticut, has begun to spread to other states in New England as
well. Vermont and Rhode Island have begun to incorporate the
ongoing storm rule, while New Hampshire has yet to decide upon
it.121 Among the New England states, Maine is the only one that
specifically does not apply the ongoing storm rule.122
The storm-in-progress rule has been applied rather strictly in
Connecticut. The rule applies even when the snowfall is “extremely
light”123 and even though others may have been able to clear
snow.124 Furthermore, the rule also applies when the snow is
“packed down and slippery because of cars traveling over it.”125
Although there may be exceptions made for “unusual circum
stances,”126 the duty to remove snow is typically not triggered until
the last snowflake has dropped.127
118. Id. at 243.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 243-44.
121. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
122. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 767 A.2d 310, 314 (Me. 2001).
The extent of the duty in Maine depends on how many people are reasonably expected
to go through the area. Id. For instance, the owner “has a duty to reasonably respond
to a foreseeable danger” during the storm if it is expected that “500 to 1000 invitees
may enter and leave its premises during a snow or ice storm”; however, “[t]he duty to
respond may be less rigorous for an entity that does not reasonably anticipate the com
ings and goings of significant numbers of invitees while a storm is in progress.” Id. at
n.2.
123. Cafarelli v. First Nat’l Supermarkets, Inc., 741 A.2d 1010,1013 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1999) (“[I]t is whether the storm has stopped, not whether the precipitation was
severe or light.”).
124. Id. (“[W]hether the local streets and some of the driveways and sidewalks of
a number of other properties had been plowed and/or cleared of snow and ice is irrele
vant to the rule set down in Kraus . . . .”).
125. Id.
126. See Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. 1989).
127. See Cafarelli, 741 A.2d at 1013.
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In application, the storm-in-progress rule may require some
fact determinations. First, because the landowner has no duty to
remove the snow or ice until “the end of a storm and a reasonable
time thereafter,”128 it must be determined when a storm actually
ends. As a question for the jury, a finding of when the storm has
ended is often a dispute between conflicting testimonies.129 To
make the determination, affidavits of meteorologists, affidavits of
anyone at the scene of the accident, and weather reports are
admitted.130
Second, when there are numerous intermittent storms, the jury
must determine whether the plaintiff slipped on “old” or “new”
ice.131 For instance, in Sinert v. Olympia and York Development
Co., when “the snow storm ended around 12:15 p.m., and . . . the
freezing rain began approximately one hour later at 1:15 p.m.,”
there was a jury question as to whether the plaintiff slipped on the
accumulation of snow or freezing rain.132 The property owner had
no duty to remove ice from the ongoing freezing rain, however
there was a duty to remove snow from the prior storm, which ended
earlier in the day.133
This determination of “old” versus “new” ice often depends on
whether the plaintiff slipped on the snow that was on top or the
snow that was underneath. Cooks v. O’Brien Properties, Inc. dem
onstrates this.134 In Cooks, a snowstorm left three to four inches of
snow on January 3.135 On January 6, a second snowstorm began
which continued through January 8, when the plaintiff fell.136 The
court found that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
128. Id. at 1012.
129. See, e.g., Haig v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., No. 3:06CV254, 2008 WL 707325,
at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2008); Bundy v. Ryefield II, Ass’n., Inc., No.
TTDCV075001189S, 2008 WL 642681, at *2 (Conn.Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008); DeSimone
v. New Haven Hous. Auth., No. CV045000155S, 2006 WL 3411041, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 13, 2006).
130. See, e.g., Rapp v. Casey, No. FSTCV065001333S, 2007 WL 3261541,at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2007) (affidavits of meteorologists and anyone at the scene of
the accident); Leonard v. G&W Mgmt., Inc., No. CV055000179S, 2007 WL 2570459, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2007) (weather reports).
131. Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243-44 (Conn. 1989) (“Our decision, how
ever, does not foreclose submission to the jury . . . of the factual determinations of
whether a storm has ended or whether a plaintiff’s injury has resulted from new ice or
old ice when the effects of separate storms begin to converge.”) (emphasis added).
132. Sinert v. Olympia &York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791, 794 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
133. Id.
134. Cooks v. O’Brien Props., Inc., 710 A.2d 788, 794 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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snow the tenant slipped on was “old” snow from the first storm
because of the tenant’s testimony that, when going down the stairs,
she stepped in footprints made by other tenants.137 In finding for
the plaintiff, the court stated, “the underlying ice and snow left on
the steps from [the first storm] may have been exposed by the foot
prints left in the snow of [the second storm] by tenants who had
descended the stairs prior to the plaintiff.”138
Although liability cannot ensue from a property owner’s com
plete inactivity during a storm, a property owner may be found lia
ble for any snow removal efforts taken during a storm that
foreseeably increases the risk of injury.139 For instance, in Victoria
v. Wilson, the property owner was found liable when the plaintiff
slipped in a post office parking lot during a storm.140 On the way
into the post office, while walking across the icy parking lot, the
plaintiff used the thin layer of snow for traction.141 A contractor
then plowed the snow, leaving the icy layer underneath.142 When
the plaintiff was returning to his car, he no longer had the traction
from the snow and slipped on the underlying ice.143 The court ac
cepted the argument that although “there is no duty to engage in
snow removal activities, there is liability in a situation where during
a snowstorm a landowner or snow removal contractor does attempt
to remove snow and ice and, by such actions, makes the conditions
for invitees worse and more dangerous.”144
Rhode Island has affirmed the notion that a “positive act” by a
property owner during a storm may result in liability, while inactiv
ity by the property owner during a storm is not punished.145 In
Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, the plaintiff left her car at a car
repair shop and when she returned to pick it up, the employees had
parked her car a hundred feet away in the parking lot.146 When the
137. Id.
138. Id. For other examples of difficult distinctions between “old” and “new”
snow, see Sullivan v. Nationwide Postal, No. CV065001931S, 2007 WL 3010806, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2007); Horbelt v. Ledges Ass’n, Inc., No. CV030483717S, 2005
WL 941409, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2005); Philippi v. Graveline, No.
CV020279745S, 2004 WL 1664090, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 2004).
139. See infra notes 140-150.
140. Victoria v. Wilson, No. 543819, 1999 WL 786356, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 21, 1999).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See infra notes 146-150.
146. Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999).
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plaintiff crossed the icy lot to retrieve her vehicle, she slipped and
fell.147 Despite the fact that the storm was ongoing, a jury question
existed because the shop essentially forced the plaintiff to traverse
the icy conditions to get to her car.148 However, in Benaski v. Wein
berg, the court contrasted the “positive act of relocating the plain
tiff’s vehicle over dangerous terrain” with a case where the
defendant property owner simply failed to do anything to remove
the snow.149 The court found that doing nothing did not constitute
an “unusual circumstance” that would warrant an exception to the
general rule of non-liability during a storm because it cannot be
shown to have “exacerbated the risk.”150
C. The Duty of Reasonable Care
The approach to snow removal adopted by Papadopoulos is an
all-encompassing standard of “reasonable[ness],” which is to be de
termined by a jury based on the specific facts of each case.151 First,
unlike the natural accumulation rule, the duty of reasonable care to
remove snow and ice remains for all accumulations, including “nat
ural accumulations.” For instance, liability can result when snow
that was shoveled or plowed into a pile, melts or falls off the pile,
and then refreezes onto an area that has foot traffic.152 Also, “in
sufficient shoveling,” where the top layer of snow is removed leav
ing a layer of ice or snow underneath, may be grounds for liability.
For instance, in Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, a New Hampshire case, the
court found negligence where a landlord plowed the driveway, but
did not remove or put sand down on the ice underneath the
snow.153 Second, unlike the storm-in-progress rule, the reasonable
ness standard is not suspended during a storm. Rather, whether or
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I. 2006) (citations omitted); see
also Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1293 (R.I. 2009) (holding that the after-the
storm rule also applies to the entranceway to a restaurant, even though the restaurant
shoveled and applied ice melt, it did not “increase any risk” to the plaintiff).
150. Benaski, 899 A.2d at 503-04.
151. Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 154 (Mass. 2010).
152. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Greenwich, 899 A.2d 563, 574 (Conn. 2006)
(property owner held liable when snow pile melted onto a sidewalk); Lisa v. Yale Univ.,
191 A. 346, 347 (Conn. 1937) (verdict for plaintiff upheld where snow melted from pile
onto walkway). The rationale for this result is “that there [is] more snow in the area . . .
than there would have been if [the property owner] had not acted.” Smith, 899 A.2d at
574; see also Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 102-03 (Me. 1972).
153. Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 229 A.2d 338, 339 (N.H. 1967).
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not a property owner should clear snow and ice during a storm is a
factual determination to be made by the jury in each case.154
Perhaps the most important aspect of the reasonableness stan
dard is a shift from a question of law for the judge to a question of
fact for the jury.155 Under the natural accumulation rule, if it was
evident that the accumulation in question was natural, the judge
had the authority to grant summary judgment for the property
owner.156 If, and only if, the accumulation might have been artifi
cial, the case would then proceed to the jury for the ultimate deter
mination of whether there was negligence.157 Similarly, under the
storm-in-progress rule, if it is evident that there was an ongoing
storm at the time of the plaintiff’s fall, the judge had the authority
to grant summary judgment for the property owner.158 The case
would only proceed to the jury if there were a legitimate question
regarding when the storm ended.159

154. See Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154 (“[A] fact finder will determine what
snow and ice removal efforts are reasonable in light of the expense they impose on the
landowner and the probability and seriousness of the foreseeable harm to others.”)
(citation omitted).
155. Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58
YALE L.J. 667, 667 (1949) (“[Q]uestions of law are for the court and questions of fact
for the jury.”).
156. There are numerous examples cited throughout this Note in which summary
judgment has been granted for the defendant on the basis of natural accumulations,
meaning that the case never made it to the jury. See, e.g., Seidlitz v. Beverly Enter
prises, Inc., No. 08-P-1123, 2009 WL 902113, at *1-2 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009)
(summary judgment granted for property owner); Goulart v. Canton Hous. Auth., 783
N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (same).
157. See, e.g., Reardon v. Parisi, 822 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005);
Plante v. Town of Blackstone, No. 092632, 2010 WL 2764696, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
May 11, 2010); Garand v. Worcester Hous. Auth., No. 051000D, 2009 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 36, at *3-9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb 6, 2009).
158. See, e.g., Leon v. DeJesus, 2 A.3d 956, 959 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Valagic v.
Inline Plastics Corp., No. CV044000841, 2006 WL 1075147, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
4, 2006); Barile v. Edison House, LLC, No. CV010506111S, 2003 WL 22786284, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2003); Uhelsky v. One Research Drive Associates, Inc., No.
CV010075247S, 2002 WL 31928610, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2002); Fryer v.
Farmington Square, LLC, No. CV010804593S, 2002 WL 31415043, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 30, 2002).
159. See, e.g., Haig v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., No. 3:06CV254, 2008 WL 707325,
at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2008); Bundy v. Ryefield II, Ass’n., Inc., No.
TTDCV075001189S, 2008 WL 642681, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008);
DeSimone v. New Haven Hous. Auth., No. CV045000155S, 2006 WL 3411041, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2006).
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PAPADOPOULOS V. TARGET CORPORATION: THE
COURT’S RATIONALE

Papadopoulos abolished the natural accumulation rule because
it found the rule to be flawed in both its justification and its applica
tion.160 The two primary justifications for an exception to the duty
of reasonable care for snow and ice, as acknowledged in Papado
poulos, are (1) the snow and ice constitute an open and obvious
danger and (2) it is impractical to give property owners a duty to
clear snow and ice, given the nature and scope of these condi
tions.161 The court dismissed both of these justifications.162
The court rejected the traditional notion that snow and ice are
“open and obvious” and can thus be avoided, and opted to take the
modern Restatement approach.163 The “open and obvious” doc
trine states that a property owner has no duty to warn of, or re
move, a danger that is open and obvious, because visitors are able
to recognize the danger and avoid it.164 The underlying rationale is
that “it is not reasonably foreseeable that a visitor exercising (as the
law presumes) reasonable care for his own safety would suffer in
jury from such blatant hazards.”165 Traditionally, it was argued that
snow and ice are open and obvious hazards and thus it should be
expected that people would notice them and avoid injury.166 The
court disagreed with this concept and opted to take the modern,
amended version of the open and obvious doctrine, which can be
found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.167 Under the new Re
statement approach, despite the fact that the danger is open and
obvious, property owners may be liable if they “can and should an
ticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the
[lawful visitor] notwithstanding its known or obvious danger.”168
Furthermore,
160. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 150-56 (Mass. 2010).
161. Id. at 151-52.
162. Id. at 151.
163. Id.
164. Id. (“The open and obvious doctrine provides that a property owner has no
duty to warn of an open and obvious danger, because the warning would be superfluous
for an ordinarily intelligent plaintiff.”) (citation omitted).
165. O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 726 N.E.2d 951, 954-55 (Mass. 2000).
166. Id. at 954 (“[A] landowner’s duty to protect lawful visitors against dangerous
conditions on his property ordinarily does not extend to dangers that would be obvious
to persons of average intelligence.”).
167. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 151 (citing Soederberg v. Concord Greene
Condo. Ass’n, 921 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS ch. 13, § 343A cmt. f, at 220 (1965)).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 13, § 343A cmt. f, at 220 (1965).
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“[O]ne of the specific circumstances where harm to others is
foreseeable is ‘where the [property owner] has reason to expect
that the [lawful visitor] will proceed to encounter the known or
obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the
advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.’”169

The court believes “it is reasonable [for property owners] to expect
that a hardy New England visitor would” decide to walk through
the snow rather than turn back or go around it.170 Also, the court
notes that an open and obvious danger does not always preclude
liability and, anyway, it is not related to the question of whether the
accumulation is natural or artificial.171
The court then addressed the second argument in favor of the
natural accumulation rule, “that enforcement of an affirmative obli
gation to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice would be
impractical, if not impossible, given the nature of the winter climate
in the Commonwealth.”172 The Court rejected this argument by
pointing out that all of the other New England states have already
abolished the natural accumulation rule.173 The court relied, in par
ticular, on the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s reasoning “that today
a landlord, armed with an ample supply of salt, sand, scrapers, shov
els and even perhaps a snow blower” can adequately remove all
types of precipitation.174
In addition to attacking its justification, the court criticized the
natural accumulation rule for producing arbitrary results that per
mit property owners to act negligently and ignore the ultimate goal
of ensuring the safety of all lawful visitors.175 First, the court rea
sons that the natural/artificial distinction is similar to the arbitrary
invitee/licensee distinction, which was abolished in Massachusetts
169. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 151 (citations omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id. Note, however, that the open and obvious doctrine is still applicable. It
is relevant to the question of the plaintiff’s negligence. See Goldman v. United States,
790 F.2d 181, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying Massachusetts law in a Federal Tort
Claims Act action to find that when a parking lot was mostly cleared, but there was one
small patch of snow and ice that was noticeable, the open and obvious doctrine applied
to preclude liability).
172. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 151-52 & n.15 (citing Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 A. 705, 706 (Conn.
1925); Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 104 (Me.1972); Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 229
A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1967); Fuller v. Hous. Auth. of Providence, 279 A.2d 438, 441 (R.I.
1971); Smith v. Monmaney, 255 A.2d 674, 676 (Vt. 1969)).
174. Id. at 152 (quoting Fuller, 279 A.2d at 440).
175. Id. at 150.
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several decades ago.176 Mounsey v. Ellard abolished the invitee/
licensee distinction because it produced arbitrary results with no le
gal basis.177 The distinction often became the focal point in the liti
gation, even when it was not relevant to the particular case.178
Thus, in Mounsey v. Ellard, the court abandoned these categories in
favor of a general duty of reasonable care that could be molded to
fit any situation.179 Papadopoulos pointed out that, similar to the
invitee/licensee distinction, the natural/artificial distinction “ob
scure[s] rather than illuminate[s] the relevant factors which should
govern determination[s] of the question[s] of duty” and should like
wise be abolished.180
Second, the court stated that snow and ice are similar to other
foreign substances and should likewise be considered actionable de
fects.181 As previously mentioned, under Massachusetts law, other
foreign substances dropped or left on the ground by unknown third
parties (i.e. customers) are considered defects that the property
owner has a duty to remove.182 The court noted that snow and ice
accumulations are similar to foreign substances dropped by people
and, therefore, the same duty to remove them should apply.183 The
court asserted that the purpose of placing a duty on the property
owner was to keep the lawful visitors safe, and “[this] rationale has
no greater force when the source of the danger is an act of nature
rather than an act of another person.”184
Third, the court observed that the natural accumulation rule is
very difficult to apply and often contrary to other fundamental con
cepts.185 For examples, the court pointed out that the determina
tion of whether snow and ice are natural or artificial accumulations
often turned upon fine distinctions regarding the size of ruts in the
ice or the physical composition of a snow pile.186 Furthermore,
these conditions can be quickly altered by people, cars, or even the
176. Id. at 150; see supra Part I.A.
177. Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 49, 51 (Mass. 1973); see supra Part I.A.1.
178. Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 46-49; see supra Part I.A.1.
179. Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 51-52; see also Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 151-52.
180. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 51).
181. Id. at 150-51 (citations omitted).
182. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text; see also Papadopoulos, 930
N.E.2d at 150-51 (citing Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276,
1286-87 (Mass. 2007); Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry., 94 N.E. 386, 386 (Mass. 1911)).
183. See Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 150.
184. Id. at 150-51.
185. Id. at 152-53.
186. Id.; see supra Part II.A.
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passage of time.187 Also, the court noted that property owners that
remove snow are free from liability even if the efforts “foreseeably
increase the risk of mishap.”188 For instance, the court pointed to
property owners that avoided liability when they shoveled a pile
uphill of a walkway or shoveled only the top layer of snow while
leaving the more dangerous ice underneath.189 The court asserted
that allowing this conduct is contrary to one of the major tenets of
tort law that someone who voluntarily “acts to mitigate a potential
hazard” has a duty “to exercise reasonable care, even where no pre
existing duty to act was owed.”190
In the end, the court found that the natural accumulation rule
cannot be justified.191 In the court’s opinion, it is an arbitrary stan
dard that is based upon faulty logic, it is difficult to apply, and it
produces unfavorable results.192 Ultimately, property owners are
not properly held accountable to clear snow and do so safely, and,
therefore, the general public suffers.193
IV.

LOOKING AHEAD: THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD
THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE

AND

A. Snow and Ice are a Larger Burden to Remove from a
Property than Other Foreign Substances and thus
Deserve Unique Treatment
Papadoupolos held that snow and ice are similar to other for
eign substances and likewise should be governed by the catch-all
reasonableness standard;194 however, snow and ice are fundamen
tally unique from other foreign substances, because, first, their re
moval is a much larger burden on the property owner and, second,
unlike other foreign substances their presence is known to the gen
eral public.195
First, in terms of sheer quantity, the removal of snow and ice
that covers an entire property is a far greater burden on the prop
187. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 152; see supra Part II.A.
188. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 153 (quoting Goulart v. Canton Hous. Auth.,
783 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)).
189. Id. at 153.
190. Id. (citing Davis v. Westwood Grp., 652 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Mass. 1995)).
191. Id. at 156.
192. Id. at 150-56.
193. See infra Part IV.
194. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154; see supra text accompanying notes 181
184.
195. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
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erty owner than the removal of other foreign substances that are
dropped onto a floor. The typical foreign substance case involves
something dangerous being left on the floor in an establishment
such that an innocent patron may trip or slip upon it.196 Common
examples of items dropped or left on the floor are banana peels,
water that remained after mopping, piles of dirt that were swept up,
or other small things left on the floor by either employees or pa
trons.197 These situations are occasional mishaps that take minimal
effort to fix. Once the danger is noticed, either the item must be
picked up or the mess must be cleaned up within a reasonable
time,198 a responsibility that no doubt is expected of the average
janitor or cleaning service in any commercial establishment. This
minimal duty to clean up a small mess is in stark contrast to the
sometimes enormous duty to remove snow and ice from an entire
property, the extent of which includes shoveling or plowing the
parking lots, the driveways, and the walkways.199 For sure, picking
up a banana peel cannot be compared to removing a foot or more
of snow from an entire parking lot. Indeed, the removal of snow
and ice is often too large of a burden for a property owner to han
dle alone and thus requires the hiring of an independent
contractor.200
In addition to the greater quantity that must be removed, the
unpredictable manner in which snow and ice can change in compo
sition and shape through melting, freezing, or otherwise, makes it
more difficult to ensure safe conditions for human traffic at all
times. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized this
fact.201 Highlighting the unpredictable manner in which a safe con
dition can rapidly turn into a dangerous condition, the court stated,
“a number of conditions might exist which within a very short time
could cause the formation of ice . . . without fault of the owner and
without reasonable opportunity on his part to remove it or to warn
against it or even to ascertain its presence.”202
196. See supra Part I.A.2.
197. See supra note 27 (providing examples of various foreign substances that
have been left on the floor).
198. See supra note 34.
199. See supra Part II (highlighting multiple cases of property owners clearing
snow from parking lots, sidewalks, and any other area on the property that the public
has access to).
200. See supra note 15.
201. See Collins v. Collins, 16 N.E.2d 665, 665 (Mass. 1938).
202. Id.
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Second, when there is snow and ice on a property, in contrast
to other foreign substances, their presence is usually known to the
general public. In the case of a foreign substance left in a store
aisle, the unlucky patron who comes upon it has no way to know of
its existence and thus cannot avoid it or, at least, proceed with cau
tion. On the other hand, snowstorms, and the consequent accumu
lation of snow, are plainly visible to the public at large. In some
situations, the snow or ice can be avoided altogether. And, where
the only way to a destination is through the snow or ice, it is at least
known to approach the situation with caution. To the average per
son in Massachusetts, crossing this terrain is a common
occurrence.203
Overall, snow and ice are a unique hazard because, (a) from
the property owner’s perspective, it is a very large and difficult bur
den to constantly monitor its presence and ensure its removal, and
(b) from the public’s perspective, it is typically a hazard that they
are aware of and that they unavoidably traverse frequently
throughout the winter. It is not a coincidence that snow and ice,
and not any other foreign substance, have repeatedly been given
special treatment by states throughout New England.204
B. Due to the Unique Nature of Snow and Ice, the Duty of
Reasonable Care, Alone, is Not Appropriate and the
Storm-in-Progress Rule Should be Incorporated
1. Due to the Difficulties Involved in Snow Removal,
Courts Have Avoided Using the Malleable Duty
of Reasonable Care in Order to Prevent
Overburdening Property Owners
Recognizing the difficulties involved in snow removal, courts in
Massachusetts, and throughout New England, have consistently
been uncomfortable applying the malleable duty of reasonable care
for fear that they will over-burden property owners. Evidence of
203. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Mass. 2010) (“[I]t is
reasonable to expect that a hardy New England visitor would choose to risk crossing the
snow or ice rather than turn back . . . .”).
204. See supra Part II.B. and Part I.A.3; see also Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240,
243-44 (Conn. 1989) (adopting the storm-in-progress rule in Connecticut); Woods v.
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 357 (Mass. 1883) (establishing the natural
accumulation rule for the first time in Massachusetts); Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators,
Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999) (applying the storm-in-progress rule); Turmel v.
Univ. of Vt., No. S0980-01 Cncv., 2004 WL 5460386, at *2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004)
(applying the storm-in-progress rule).
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this fact is found in the existence of the natural accumulation rule
for one hundred thirty years in Massachusetts205 and Connecticut’s
adoption of the storm-in-progress rule, which has begun to appear
in other New England states as well.206
Unwilling to treat snow and ice like every other hazard, Massa
chusetts decided in 1883 to experiment with the notion that there is
no duty to remove “natural accumulations” of snow and ice.207 Un
fortunately, as the case law developed, this approach proved to be
difficult in application. The distinction between “natural” and “ar
tificial” accumulations, a difference that was based on the composi
tion and shape of the snow and ice, proved to be arbitrary and
confusing.208 Cases were decided based upon small differences in
the size of divots in ice or the amount of foot tracks or tire tracks on
the snow.209 Also, the rule produced some results that were con
trary to fundamental tort concepts, such as the allowance, in some
situations, of negligent snow removal.210
Underlying the natural accumulation rule is the notion that it
would be impracticable to place upon property owners an affirma
tive duty to remove snow and ice.211 Although the rule proved un
savory in application, this underlying purpose always has, and still
does, remain firm. In fact, due to its allegiance to this purpose,
Massachusetts was unwilling to let go of the natural accumulation
rule, despite its drawbacks, for over a century.212
Papadopoulos found that the impracticability argument did
not justify the natural accumulation rule213; however, this does not
205. See supra Part II.
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. Woods, 134 Mass. at 357.
208. See supra Part II.A.
209. See supra Part II.A; see, e.g., Delano v. Garrettson-Ellis Lumber Co., 281
N.E.2d 282, 284 (Mass. 1972) (“‘muddy ice,’ with tire marks and ruts”); Seidlitz v. Bev
erly Enterprises, Inc., No. 08-P-1123, 2009 WL 902113, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 6,
2009) (evaluating the size of ruts in the ice); Phipps v. Aptucxet Post No. 5988 V. F. W.
Bldg. Ass’n, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1042, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (footprints and tire
tracks).
210. See supra Part II.A; see, e.g., Sullivan v. Town of Brookline, 626 N.E.2d 870,
872 (Mass. 1994) (insufficient shoveling did not result in liability); Dipersio v. TX Plan
ning Trust, No. 08-P-777, 2009 WL 1011060, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 20, 2009) (cita
tion omitted) (stating that piling snow uphill from a walkway would not result in
liability).
211. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 150-52 (Mass. 2010).
212. See supra Part I.A.3; see also Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 154 (abolishing
the natural accumulation rule in Massachusetts); Woods, 134 Mass. at 357 (establishing
the natural accumulation rule for the first time in Massachusetts).
213. See Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 150-52; see also supra Part III.
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mean that it cannot justify the storm-in-progress rule. In support of
Papadopoulos’s denial of the impracticability argument, the court
pointed out that the other New England states had already abol
ished or refused to adopt the natural accumulation rule.214 The
court also referred to a quote from the Rhode Island Supreme
Court to make the point that owners have sufficient supplies to ad
dress snow removal concerns.215 It may be true that the impractica
bility of removing snow and ice from a property may not warrant
the natural accumulation rule, which completely removes the prop
erty owner’s duty to remove “natural” accumulations. However, it
certainly warrants the storm-in-progress rule, a less extreme rule
that does not eliminate the duty to remove accumulations, but
rather merely gives the property owner more time to do so.
Furthermore, the concern of impracticability of snow and ice
removal remains firm in other courts. The most glaring example is
Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, a case that was decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court about one week prior to Papadopoulos.216
There, the court held that the natural accumulation rule, despite its
faults, was better than placing an excessive burden on property
owners.217 In fact, the court held that the natural accumulation rule
was so strong that it applied even to “common carrier[s],” which
have the highest “duty of care.”218 The court stated:
[W]e recognize the dangers posed by natural accumulations of
snow and ice. The absence of a duty to remove them “does not
rest upon the notion that the conditions presented by such accu
mulations are safe. To the contrary, the hazards presented have
always been acknowledged, but the imposition of an obligation to
remedy those conditions would be so unreasonable and impracti
cal as to negate the imposition of a legal duty to do so.”219
214. Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 151-52 n.15 (citing Reardon v. Shimelman, 128
A. 705, 706 (Conn. 1925); Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 104 (Me. 1972);
Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 229 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1967); Fuller v. Hous. Auth. of Provi
dence, 279 A.2d 438, 441 (R.I. 1971); Smith v. Monmaney, 255 A.2d 674, 676 (Vt.
1969)).
215. Id. at 152 (citing Fuller v. Hous. Auth. of Providence, 279 A.2d 438, 441 (R.I.
1971)).
216. Krywin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 450 (Ill. 2010).
217. Id. The plaintiff in Krywin requested a rehearing on the matter after the
Papadopoulos decision, but this request was denied. Id. at 457 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
218. Id. at 450.
219. Id. (quoting Trevino v. Flash Cab Co., 651 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995)).
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The natural accumulation rule is certainly used in a minority of
states for general and business premises liability,220 but it is far from
gone. Including Illinois, at least thirteen states continue to apply
the rule.221
Connecticut learned through experience that the duty of rea
sonable care, on its own, places an unreasonable burden on prop
erty owners, and, as a result, Connecticut eventually created the
storm-in-progress rule.222 In 1925, Connecticut explicitly rejected
the natural accumulation rule and adopted the duty of reasonable
care.223 However, that decision did not last. After applying the
reasonableness standard for over sixty years, Connecticut carved
out an exception from the general standard in the form of the
storm-in-progress rule.224 There, the Connecticut Supreme Court
held that property owners had no duty to remove snow until “the
end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter.”225 Subsequently,
the storm-in-progress rule has developed in Vermont and Rhode
Island.226
220. See Michael J. Polelle, Is the Natural Accumulation Rule All Wet?, 26 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 631 app. at 656-62 (1995).
221. See id. (citing states that apply the rule to general/business premises: Fergu
son v. J. Bacon & Sons, 406 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (Kentucky); Miller v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 164 So.2d 676, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (Louisiana); Willis v.
Springfield Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 804 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (Mis
souri); Brandert v. Scottsbluff Nat’l Bank & Trusts Co., 235 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Neb.
1975) (Nebraska); Herndon v. Arco Petroleum Co., 536 P.2d 1023, 1024-25 (Nev. 1975)
(Nevada); Nevins v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (N.Y. App.Div.
1990) (New York); Strandness v. Montgomery Ward, 199 N.W.2d 690, 691 (N.D. 1972)
(North Dakota); Weaver v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 572 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989) (Ohio); Sullins v. Mills, 395 P.2d 787, 789 (Okla. 1964) (Oklahoma); Mead
ows v. Heritage Vill. Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C.
1991) (South Carolina); Hodge v. Quik-Pik Icehouse, 445 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969) (Texas); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963) (Wyoming)). Since
1995, Montana is the only state other than Massachusetts to abolish the natural accumu
lation rule in general/business premises liability. See Richardson v. Corvallis Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 950 P.2d 748, 755-56 (Mont. 1997) (abolishing the natural accumulation rule
and adopting “a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably
safe condition and to warn of any hidden or lurking dangers”).
222. See Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240, 243-44 (Conn. 1989) (adopting the
storm-in-progress rule); Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 A. 705, 706 (Conn. 1925) (adopting
a reasonableness standard).
223. See Reardon, 128 A. at 706 (adopting a reasonableness standard and noting
that “we are wholly unable to justify the Massachusetts rule”).
224. See Kraus, 558 A.2d at 243-44; supra Part II.B.
225. Kraus, 558 A.2d at 243.
226. See Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 716-17 (R.I. 1999);
Turmel v. Univ. of Vt., No. S0980-01 Cncv, 2004 WL 5460386, at *2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr.
20, 2004).
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Overall, New England states have consistently recognized the
large burden involved in snow removal and has accordingly pro
vided exceptions to the duty of reasonable care to give some pro
tection to property owners. With Papadopoulos, the natural
accumulation rule is now virtually extinct.227 However, the under
lying concern that property owners may be over-burdened led to
the development of the storm-in-progress rule in its place.
2. The Storm-in-Progress Rule is the Best Available Alternative
Because it Provides Some Protection to Property Owners,
But Also Ensures that Property Owners Remain Accountable
and the General Public Remains Safe
The storm-in-progress rule, similar to the natural accumulation
rule, is based upon the sound justification that the removal of snow
and ice is a unique and large burden. However, in application, the
storm-in-progress rule avoids the major problems that were caused
by the natural accumulation rule. The storm-in-progress rule better
fosters predictability for the general public and accountability for
the property owners. And, while the storm-in-progress rule does
have potential difficulties, they remain minimal due to the open and
apparent nature of snow and the limited scope of the storm-in-pro
gress rule.
Under the general reasonableness standard alone, the determi
nation of liability must always be made by a jury;228 in contrast, the
storm-in-progress rule, just as the natural accumulation rule before
it, gives the judge more power to grant judgment as a matter of law
for the property owner.229 Under the storm-in-progress rule, if it is
found that a storm was ongoing when the plaintiff fell, then sum
mary judgment can be granted for the property owner.230 Without
the storm-in-progress rule, the ongoing storm is not conclusive and
227. It is only “virtually” extinct, because “Maine has not abandoned the natural
accumulation rule as a limitation on a landlord’s liability to a tenant.” Papadopoulos v.
Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 152 n.16 (Mass. 2010) (citing Rosenberg v. Chapman
Nat’l Bank, 139 A. 82, 83 (Me. 1927)).
228. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Leon v. DeJesus, 2
A.3d 956, 959 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Valagic v. Inline Plastics Corp., No. CV044000841,
2006 WL 1075147, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.4, 2006); Barile v. Edison House, LLC,
No. CV010506111S, 2003 WL 22786284, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2003); Uhel
sky v. One Research Drive Assoc., Inc., No. CV 010075247S, 2002 WL 31928610, at *1,
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2002); Fryer v. Farmington Square, LLC, No.
CV010804593S, 2002 WL 31415043, at *2-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2002).
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the jury will determine, based upon the totality of the circum
stances, whether the property owner’s removal efforts were
reasonable.231
This sole reliance on the jury, and its inherent unpredictability,
is a serious concern in New England. Among the New England
states, Maine is the only state to specifically reject the storm-in
progress rule, a decision that was articulately criticized by a Ver
mont superior court.232 The Vermont court stated that due to
Maine’s refusal to adopt the storm-in-progress rule, it “is . . . guar
antee[d] that slip-and-fall cases will almost always be decided by
juries and that owners are left with a nebulous, perpetual potential
for liability without any judicial guidance about the limit of their
duty of care during the storms.”233 Indeed, the storm-in-progress
rule provides a necessary avenue for the judge to ferret out the
most unsubstantiated claims, and relieve the property owners of an
overwhelming, excessive burden.
Also, in stark contrast to the natural accumulation rule, the
storm-in-progress rule is a relatively narrow exception to the duty
of reasonable care, and provides the minimal amount of protection
that property owners should be given. The storm-in-progress rule
does not remove the duty of reasonable care, but rather it gives the
property owner a grace period where the duty to remove snow is
suspended while the storm is ongoing.234 However, after the storm
ends and “a reasonable time thereafter,” the duty of reasonable
care returns and the property owner is expected to clear all of the
snow and ice to ensure that the property is safe.235 Therefore,
under the storm-in-progress rule, the snow and ice will be cleared
just the same as they would be without the storm-in-progress rule,
except the property owner is given more time to do so. The natural
accumulation rule provided much more protection to property own
ers. If an accumulation was deemed “natural,” the property owner
231. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text; Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at
154 (“[A] fact finder will determine what snow and ice removal efforts are reasonable in
light of the expense they impose on the landowner and the probability and seriousness
of the foreseeable harm to others.”) (citations omitted).
232. Turmel v. Univ. of Vt., No. S0980-01 Cncv, 2004 WL 5460386 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 2004) (citing Jennifer Williams, Note, Budzkov v. One City Center Associates
Limited Partnership: Maine’s Unique Approach to Business Owner’s Duty to Remove
Ice and Snow, 55 ME. L. REV. 517, 540-41 (2003)).
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying note 119; see also Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d
240, 243-44 (Conn. 1989).
235. Kraus, 558 A.2d at 243.
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had no duty whatsoever to remove it.236 Unless the snow was al
tered in some way such that it became “artificial,” there would
never be a duty to remove the snow.237 The storm-in-progress rule
recognizes that public safety concerns require that a duty to remove
snow and ice should always exist. However, the storm-in-progress
rule merely states that property owners can, without fear of poten
tial liability, wait until a storm ends to clear the accumulations.
Also in contrast to the natural accumulation rule, the storm-in
progress rule ensures accountability of the property owners, be
cause it does not permit negligent snow removal at any time,
whether or not a storm is ongoing.238 Under the natural accumula
tion rule, the property owner is often held not liable for negligent
snow removal.239 For instance, “incomplete shoveling,” i.e. where
the top layer of snow is removed leaving only an icy layer under
neath, or piling snow uphill on a walkway does not result in liability
even though they “foreseeably increase the risk of mishap.”240
Therefore, under the natural accumulation rule, property owners
feel free to remove snow at any time; however, there is nothing that
holds them accountable to do so in a safe manner. Papadopoulos
properly deemed this to be contrary to the fundamental tort princi
ple, that someone who removes a hazard has a duty to use reasona
ble care in doing so.241 The storm-in-progress rule, in contrast, is
consistent with this principle, because negligent shoveling is pun
ished no matter when it is done.242 While it is clear that making no
attempt to remove snow and ice during a storm cannot result in
liability, it is equally clear that negligent removal of snow during a
storm (or not during a storm) can result in liability. In fact, the
property owner can be liable for any “positive act” that foreseeably
increases the risk of injury.243 This can include, as discussed earlier,
an auto shop worker moving the plaintiff’s car to a location such
that the plaintiff was forced to cross an icy terrain to get to the
236. See supra note 74 and accompanying text and Part II.A.
237. See supra note 75 and accompanying text and Part II.A; see also Watkins v.
Goodall, 138 Mass. 533, 537 (1885).
238. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text; see also Kraus, 558 A.2d at
243-44.
239. See, e.g., Goulart v. Canton Hous. Auth., 783 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2003); see Part II.A.
240. Goulart, 783 N.E.2d at 867.
241. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Mass. 2010).
242. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
243. See Benaski v. Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 503 (R.I. 2006) (citations omitted);
see also Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717-18 (R.I. 1999).
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car.244 Overall, the storm-in-progress rule promotes competent and
safe snow removal.
The storm-in-progress rule also better promotes predictability
for the general public than the natural accumulation rule. First, an
ongoing storm is something the public can easily notice. If people
are aware of the law and they see that it is snowing, then they
should at least be aware of the possibility that snow has not been
cleared. Second, because the storm-in-progress rule does not toler
ate negligent snow removal,245 any member of the public that ap
proaches snow can expect that either (1) the snow removal has
been done in a safe manner and in accordance with the duty of
reasonable care or (2) the snow has not been touched because the
storm is ongoing. On the other hand, under the natural accumula
tion rule, there is nothing to provide the public with any type of
expectation regarding what they are approaching. The snow and
ice may be completely untouched, it may be completely shoveled,
or it may have been negligently shoveled.246
On a related note, any possible injuries that result from a lack
of snow removal during a storm will be minimal because those who
decide to traverse snowy or icy terrain during a storm are at least
aware of what they may be approaching, and thus they can use ap
propriate caution. Papadopoulos rejected the open and obvious
doctrine as a justification for failing to remove snow and ice,247 and
for good reason. Relying on the Restatement, the court reasoned
that liability for a property owner should not be precluded by the
open and obvious doctrine, if it was still foreseeable that others
would walk through the dangerous terrain despite its open and ob
vious danger.248 Because it should be expected that people will
traverse through the snow despite its known danger, the snow
should be removed. And, under the storm-in-progress rule, the
snow will be removed—once the storm has ended. While the open
and obvious nature of snow and ice does not warrant a property
owner to avoid removing snow completely, it is a factor that sup
ports the notion of delaying the duty to remove snow until after the
storm has ended.
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 140-150 and accompanying text; see also Kraus, 558 A.2d at
243-44.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Mass. 2010).
248. Id.; see supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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Lastly, while the storm-in-progress rule does, in some cases,
have challenging factual determinations as to when a storm has en
ded or whether a plaintiff slipped on “old” or “new” ice, these is
sues are much less complicated than under the natural
accumulation rule and are outweighed by the positive effects of the
storm-in-progress rule. First, while these may be difficult determi
nations, they do not necessarily favor the property owner—they are
just difficult. The natural accumulation rule, on the other hand,
clearly favored the property owner, as the accumulations were pre
sumed “natural” unless proven otherwise.249 Second, determina
tions regarding the composition of the snow, such as the size of
divots or whether or not a snow pile had an icy block in it, are
typically proven by only the plaintiff’s own testimony.250 However,
in addition to the plaintiff’s testimony, there are meteorologist re
ports that anyone in the public can use to prove when a storm has
ended.251 Third, while the natural accumulation rule applied to any
snow or ice that a plaintiff fell upon at any time of the day, the
determinations under the storm-in-progress rule will be limited to
the small time frames at the beginning and end of a storm in which
the two sides could possibly dispute the storm’s presence.
Overall, the storm-in-progress rule gives property owners a
limited exception that allows them to wait until a storm has ended
to clear snow and ice from their property. Property owners are re
quired to be non-negligent, and are thus held accountable. The
public is on notice as to the rule and can easily identify when it is in
progress, so they can choose to either avoid the snow during the
storm or proceed with caution. Because the public will be aware of
what they will be approaching, injuries will be minimal. And, while
the storm-in-progress rule does include occasional difficult determi
nations, it is much less difficult than the natural accumulation rule,
and overall is outweighed by its positives. The storm-in-progress
rule is a practical rule that properly gives some legal protection to
249. See supra Part II.A and note 74.
250. See, e.g., Barrasso v. Hillview W. Condo. Trust, 904 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2009) (issue of material fact found where plaintiff stepped on what witness
described as “hardened, compacted snow and ice”); Seidlitz v. Beverly Enter., Inc., No.
08-P-1123, 2009 WL 902113, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009) (issue regarding plain
tiff’s description of tire tracks and grooves).
251. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Rapp v. Casey, No.
FSTCV065001333S, 2007 WL 3261541, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007) (affidavits
of meteorologists and anyone at the scene of the accident); Leonard v. G&W Mgmt.,
Inc., No. CV055000179S, 2007 WL 2570459, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2007)
(weather reports).
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property owners while still retaining a commitment to the safety of
the general public.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the common law has recognized the general
point that snow and ice are fundamentally different from every
other hazard and, thus, deserve unique treatment. Unlike other
foreign substances, snow and ice are a very large burden to remove
and their presence is open and obvious to the general public. Keep
ing this in mind, it is not surprising that Massachusetts courts had
been tentative for so long about imposing an affirmative duty on
property owners to clear ice and snow.
However, the court’s first attempt to ease the burden on prop
erty owners, by way of the natural accumulation rule, eventually
proved unsuccessful because it produced arbitrary results and ulti
mately did not benefit society, as there was no emphasis on public
safety.252 Because the sole focus when applying the natural ac
cumulation rule was on the composition or shape of the snow or ice
in question, thereby rendering the property owner’s conduct irrele
vant, the results were too often inconsistent with common sense
and sound legal policy.253 Property owners got away scot-free with
out making any snow removal efforts or having negligently re
moved snow. In addition, the legal determinations were difficult
for courts and often led to unclear precedent.254
Looking forward, Massachusetts should adopt the storm-in
progress rule as soon as possible, because it properly balances the
interests of both property owners and the general public. The rule
simply allows property owners to wait until a snowstorm has ended
before removing the snow and ice from the property.255 It does not
reduce the property owner’s duty—it merely delays when the duty
is triggered. And it does not provide absolute immunity during a
snowstorm—negligent conduct can result in liability no matter
when it is committed, storm or not.
252. See supra Part II.A. & Part III. Part II.A. explains how the natural accumu
lation rule was applied. Part III provides Papadopoulos’s reasoning for abolishing the
natural accumulation rule.
253. See supra note 252.
254. See supra Part II.A. (providing examples that demonstrate how, under the
natural accumulation rule, there were often difficult factual determinations based on
the shape and composition of the snow and ice at the time of the fall).
255. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text; see also Kraus v. Newton,
558 A.2d 240, 243-44 (Conn. 1989).
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The storm-in-progress rule establishes a very minimal level of
non-liability: there is no liability to a property owner if no snow
removal efforts are taken during a snowstorm. Also, because the
window for non-liability is small and because a snowstorm and the
subsequent accumulations are visible to the public, the public will
be able to predict what type of conditions they are approaching and
any injuries that occur during a storm will be minimal. Most impor
tantly, if the storm-in-progress rule is adopted, property owners will
have a legal standard they can take to the courtroom to dismiss the
most unsubstantiated claims at the summary judgment level,
thereby avoiding the jury.
As it will continue to snow in Massachusetts and snow and ice
will likely remain slippery, the burden of keeping all areas on a
property safe will remain, as always, quite extraordinary. Keeping
this in mind and recognizing that we should only place burdens on
property owners that can realistically be met, they should be given
the gift of a little more time. It cannot be denied that snow is
unique and, as it has been historically, it should be given unique
treatment. For these reasons, Massachusetts should take the next
logical step and adopt the storm-in-progress rule.
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